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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
LAWRENCE MORGAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900396-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is established 
by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of a Class B 
Misdemeanor, Attempted Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.4 (1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the trial court's verdict clearly erroneous or 
against the clear weight of the evidence? 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
State v. Striebv. 790 P.2d 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
2. Did Defendant signing the property receipt constitute a 
substantial step toward commission of the offense? 
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101 (1990) 
3. Was Defendant entrapped? 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1990) 
State v. Belt. 780 P.2d 1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a): 
In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It 
will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(1) (1990): 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
- 2 -
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101 (1990): 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense, 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt 
shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted 
was actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have 
been committed had the attendant 
circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.4 (1990): 
It is unlawful for any person to receive, 
retain, conceal, possess, or dispose of 
personal property, cash, or other form 
representing value, if he knows or has reason 
to believe the property, cash, or other form 
representing value has been obtained through 
unlawful conduct described in Section 76-6-
506.1, 76-6-506.2, or 76-6-506.3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals from a Judgment, Sentence, and Order of 
Commitment entered against him after his conviction of Attempted 
Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
the Fifth Circuit Court, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite 
presiding. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was originally charged with one (1) count of 
Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
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violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.4 (1990). Defendant filed 
a notice of entrapment defense, which motion was heard on May 30, 
1990. The court denied Defendant's claim of entrapment. A bench 
trial was held July 31, 1990. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The trial court found Defendant guilty of Attempted Property 
Obtained by Unlawful Conduct, a Class B Misdemeanor. Defendant 
waived his time for sentencing and was sentenced to a concurrent 
six- (6-) month jail sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the months of August through November, 1989, 
Defendant Lawrence Morgan was a state inmate serving time at the 
Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility. (Trial T. 101) On 
August 11, 1989, fellow state inmate John Maycock, as part of an 
extensive fraudulent credit card number scheme, ordered five (5) 
pairs of athletic shoes from the ZCMI store in Sandy, Utah, for 
five (5) inmates, including Defendant. (Trial T. 56, 62; Exhibit 
P-3) Although not challenged at trial (Trial T. 79, 122) or on 
appeal (Appellant's Brief 3, 4), the fraudulent nature of the 
transaction was established by the testimony of ZCMI personnel 
(Trial T. 7, 13), American Express personnel (Trial T. 14), a 
United States Secret Service agent (Trial T. 42) , unwitting 
victims of telephone fraud (Trial T. 46) , and fellow inmates 
(Trial T. 56, 62). In sum, inmate Maycock, through some system, 
created valid but unissued credit card numbers, telephoned area 
merchants, and ordered merchandise under a false name and address 
to be delivered to the facility as gifts for himself and other 
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inmates. Once the subject shoes arrived, they, along with 
several other items, were seized pursuant to an investigation by 
the Utah Department of Corrections and the United States Secret 
Service. 
Shortly after the August 11 transaction, inmate Maycock 
spoke with Defendant, informed him of his fraudulent scheme and 
asked Defendant for legal information. (Trial T. 74, 102) 
Defendant complied. After spending a period of time in lockdown, 
inmate Maycock returned to Defendant and notified him that he, 
Defendant, may be charged because inmate Maycock had ordered him 
a pair of shoes. (Trial T. 74, 102) Sometime between the 
August 11 transaction and November 8, 1989, Defendant also 
questioned fellow inmate Warren Sandovall regarding inmate 
Maycock's ordering of shoes. (Trial T. 64) Furthermore, during 
the same time period, Correctional Officer Aleta Bowman told 
Defendant on at least two (2) occasions that a pair of shoes 
delivered for him had been seized pursuant to the investigation. 
(Trial T. 22) However, when interviewed by investigators on 
November 9, 1989, Defendant denied any knowledge of any credit 
card fraud. (Trial T. 43) 
On November 8, 1989, Officer Bowman, under the direction of 
the United States Secret Service, the Utah Department of 
Corrections, and the Iron County Attorney's Office, presented 
property receipts for the seized items to several inmates, 
including Defendant. (Trial T. 22) Officer Bowman told Defendant 
(again) and others that the property had been seized, that she 
did not know if they would receive it, but if they wanted the 
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property, they needed to sign the receipt. (Trial T. 24, 30) 
Defendant signed his receipt for the pair of shoes. (Trial T. 24, 
30; Exhibit P-2) The receipt states "Inmate assumes full 
responsibility for the property listed." (Exhibit P-2) 
Defendant was charged with one (1) count of Property 
Obtained by Unlawful Conduct, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.4 (1990). (R. 1) Defendant filed a 
notice of entrapment defense, which was heard May 30, 1989. 
(R. 24; Entrapment Hearing Transcript) The court, after hearing 
testimony of Defendant, Officer Bowman, and arguments, took the 
motion under advisement. (Entrapment T. 35) 
At the pretrial conference on June 6, 1990, the court ruled 
on the entrapment issue as follows: 
[T]he Court cannot find that the Defendant was 
entrcipped. Finds the police merely afforded the 
Defendant an opportunity to commit the offense, the 
conduct was not induced by persistent request of the 
police, Aleta Bowman, extreme pleas of desperate 
illness, pity, inordinate sums of money, et cetera. 
And, in fact, the officer told the Defendant that the 
property was seized pursuant to an investigation at the 
time it was signed for. 
(Pretrial T. 2) 
A bench trial was held July 13, 1990. After hearing the 
evidence and arguments, the court found Defendant guilty of the 
lesser-included offense of Attempt to Obtain Property by Unlawful 
Conduct, a Class B Misdemeanor. (Trial T. 126) The court found 
beyond a reasonable doubt the property was fraudulently obtained 
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and that Defendant was so aware. (Trial T. 126) However, in 
reducing the offense, the court stated: 
But I don't find that the Defendant actually took 
possession or constructive possession. I don't find 
that he—beyond a reasonable doubt, that he exercised 
control. We don't have a similar agency situation to 
the cases cited in the outline for the usual business 
relationship or co-defendant relationship. We have a 
situation where its a jailer or a guard to an inmate 
situation. I think its different from possession 
ownership of a person arrested who has it on their 
property when they are taken into the facility. 
(Trial T. 126) 
At counsel for Defendant's request, the court reiterated its 
findings against the entrapment defense: 
And for the same reasons I believe I stated on the 
record earlier, the Court has not found that the 
Defendant was entrapped. The opportunity was afforded 
him and he took that opportunity to sign for the 
property, the shoes, but the entrapment motion was 
denied and the Court did not find that the Defendant 
was entrapped in this case for the reasons stated 
earlier on the record. I haven't seen anything in the 
evidence today that would change the earlier ruling. 
(Trial T. 127-128) Defendant waived his time for sentencing and 
was immediately sentenced to a six- (6-) month concurrent jail 
sentence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's verdict was not clearly erroneous or 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Defendant was not 
entrapped into committing the offense charged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S GUILTY VERDICT. THEREFORE, THE 
VERDICT WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD 
NOT BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL. 
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In order to reverse the guilty verdict entered by a trial 
court, this Court must conclude the verdict was "clearly 
erroneous." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In other words, this Court 
must conclude the verdict was "against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or otherwise [reach] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made[.]" State v. Strieby, 
790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
The elements of the offense charged are as follows: 
1. Defendant received, retained, concealed, 
possessed, or disposed of personal property; 
2. Defendant knew or had reason to believe the 
property had been obtained by the unlawful conduct of 
purchasing or attempting to purchase property by the use of 
a false or fictitious credit card number; 
3. The property had a retail value of less than two 
hundred fifty dollars ($250) ; and 
4. The events occurred on November 8, 1989, in Iron 
County, State of Utah. 
The trial court found the evidence established all the elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt but for the first. The trial court 
could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant received 
or possessed the property. (Trial T. 126) Apparently, the trial 
court, in entering a guilty verdict for the lesser-included 
offense of Attempted Property Obtained by Unlawful Conduct, found 
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that Defendant's signing the property receipt constituted an 
attempt, or a "substantial step" to commit the offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-4-101 (1990). 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's findings as 
to the third or fourth elements. Nor does Defendant challenge 
the court's finding as to the second portion of the second 
element, namely the unlawful nature of the purchase or attempted 
purchase. Defendant does challenge the trial court's findings as 
to element one and the first part of element two, namely 
Defendant's mental state and his attempted receipt or possession 
of the property. 
Defendant claims the only evidence that Defendant "had any 
contact with this particular pair of shoes was the conversation 
that he had with Aleta Bowman at the time of the execution of the 
Property Receipt." (Appellant's Brief 4) That is a false 
statement. In addition to Officer Bowman's conversation with 
Defendant wherein she again informed him the property had been 
seized (Trial T. 24, 30), there is more than sufficient evidence 
to support the second element, whether Defendant knew or had 
reason to believe the property had been unlawfully obtained. 
Officer Bowman told Defendant on at least two prior occasions 
that the shoes had been seized pursuant to the investigation. 
(Trial T. 22) Defendant himself, both at the entrapment hearing 
and at trial, testified that inmate Maycock advised him of his 
criminal scheme, that Defendant provided information and advice, 
and that inmate Maycock told him well prior to November 8 that he 
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had ordered Defendant a pair of shoes. (Entrapment T. 17-18; 
Trial T. 74, 102) Inmate Sandovall testified he had a 
conversation with Defendant regarding inmate Maycock's ordering 
shoes. (Trial T. 64) Defendant's culpable mental state is 
further established by his dishonest denial of any such knowledge 
when interviewed by investigators. (Trial T. 43) Clearly there 
is sufficient evidence to support the court's findings as to 
Defendant's mental state. 
Regarding the first element, Defendant's attempted receipt 
or possession of the property, Defendant's challenge is couched 
more in terms of Defendant's mental state rather than whether or 
not Defendant's conduct constituted an attempt to commit the 
offense charged. Clearly, under the facts of this case, 
Defendant's signing of the property receipt constituted an 
attempt or a substantial step to commit the greater offense of 
actual receipt or possession. Defendant was familiar with the 
property receipt. (Entrapment T. 10-11) It was the standard 
document used for inmates to receive property. The receipt 
states "Inmate assumes full responsibility for the property 
listed." (Exhibit P-2) Officer Bowman told Defendant, just prior 
to his sicjning, that she did not know whether he would receive it 
or not, but that if he wanted the property, he had to sign. 
(Trial T. 24, 30) Defendant willingly signed. Defendant's 
signing of the document was "strongly corroborative of [his] 
intent to commit the offense." Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(2) 
(1990). Therefore, it constituted a substantial step, or an 
attempt, to commit the offense. 
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To rebut the State's clear weight of evidence, Defendant 
offered the testimony of Defendant and two other inmates. 
Defendant, a convict of numerous felonies, testified that when 
Officer Bowman presented the property receipt, she told him she 
would deliver the shoes. (Trial T. 107) He also testified that 
after inmate Maycock informed him of the shoe order, he, together 
with fellow inmate Ron Gier, inquired of Officer Bowman three or 
four times whether he had received any property, to which Officer 
Bowman responded in the negative. (Trial T. 104) Defendant also 
testified he assumed the pair of shoes he signed for was a 
birthday gift from his sister. (Trial T. 107) His birthday was 
September 18. (Trial T. 104) Inmate Martin Hernandez, a thrice-
convicted felon, testified consistent to Defendant's version of 
the November 8 conversation. (Trial T. 89-90) Inmate Gier, also 
a thrice-convicted felon, testified consistently with Defendant's 
testimony. (Trial T. 96-98) Officer Bowman refuted all three 
inmates' testimony. (Trial T. 25) 
Evidence provided by Defendant did not rebut the clear 
weight of the evidence as presented by the State. As Rule 52(a) 
states, "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." See also 
State v. Wright 744 P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) Obviously, the 
trial court found Officer Bowman and the other State's witnesses 
to be far more credible than Defendant's convict witnesses. 
Nothing in the trial transcript or the rest of the appellate 
record can support a determination by this Court that the trial 
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court/s verdict was clearly erroneous or against the clear weight 
of the evidence. 
POINT II 
OFFICER BOWMAN'S ACTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
ENTRAPMENT. DEFENDANT WAS MERELY AFFORDED AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE. 
Defendant claims he was entrapped because "[Officer] 
Bowman's methods created a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed—if this was, in fact, the commission of an 
offense—and without her efforts, no offense could have been 
committed." (Appellant's Brief 7) Defendant does not specify 
which methods he targets as being suspect. 
As stated by Defendant, the entrapment defense is set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(1) (1990): 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
In State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this 
Court accurately summarized Utah case law on the issue of 
entrapment. As stated in Belt, Utah adopts the objective test 
for entrapment which focuses on "whether police conduct used in 
obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense rose to the 
level of inducement or persuasion that would effectively persuade 
the average person to commit the offense." Id. at 1274 (citing 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)). Examples of improper 
police inducement are persuasion, depending upon the individual 
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circumstances, including extreme pleas of sympathy, desperate 
illness, pity, or close friendship, or offers of inordinate sums 
of money. Belt, 780 P.2d at 1274 (quoting Taylor, 599 p.2d at 
503) . 
If the trial court had believed Defendant and his fellow 
convicts that Officer Bowman lied by saying she would bring the 
property right away, then perhaps such conduct would have 
constituted entrapment. But that is not the issue here. The 
trial court is free to believe whomever he chooses according to 
his honest convictions. He chose to believe Officer Bowman. 
(Pretrial T. 2; Trial T. 127-128) The Court, apparently 
referring to Belt and Taylor, specifically found Defendant's 
conduct was not induced by persistent requests, desperate pleas, 
or cash offers by Officer Bowman. (Pretrial T. 2) Officer 
Bowman's testimony clearly supports such a finding. She 
expressly told Defendant and the other inmates that the property 
had been seized, that she was not sure they would receive it, but 
that if they wanted it, they needed to sign. In fact, one inmate 
refused to sign. (Trial T. 24, 30) As the trial court stated, 
"The opportunity was afforded [Defendant] and he took that 
opportunity[.]" (Trial T. 127-128) Under section 76-2-303, that 
is not entrapment. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the State of Utah respectfully asserts that 
the clear weight of the evidence at trial was in support of the 
trial court's verdict. Therefore, the verdict was not clearly 
erroneous and should not be overturned on appeal. Furthermore, 
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the State of Utah respectfully asserts that Officer Bowman's 
conduct was in all aspects proper and that she merely afforded 
Defendant an opportunity to commit an offense, which opportunity 
he willingly accepted. Therefore, he was not entrapped. The 
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
Defendant's conviction. 
DATED this (s day of February, 1991. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
J&& By: / ^ ^ C ^ V (^^-t^t-^^M x-
KYLEyD. LATIMER 
Chrex Deputy Iron County Attorney 
for Respondent State of Utah 
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